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THE SURPRISING IRRELEVANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKRUPTCY 
 
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI* 
 
I.  THE IRONY OF THE IRRELEVANCE 
 
By any standard of logic, the influence of the shari'a, that body of overlapping 
and oft conflicting rules derived by medieval jurists from Islam's sacred texts,
1
 
should be far more relevant in the area of bankruptcy than it is.  Understanding the 
sources of the broad marginalization of shari'a as it relates to modern bankruptcy 
law in the Muslim world tells us much about the sharply limited scope of Islamic 
revivalism, as concerns economic and commercial matters, and perhaps even a little 
bit about Islamism's limited legal ambitions more generally.   
For some time, we have been told that the rise of Islamism presages a series of 
states that will be governed primarily by shari'a.
2
 Yet after an Islamic revolution
3
 
and Islamic coups,
4
 Islamist electoral victories
5
 and Islamist-driven constitution 
making,
6
 we have seen very little shari'a in modernity except in the area of personal 
status, which generally encompasses family law and the law of inheritance.
7
 
Islamized states have generally preferred to retain their transplanted legal codes 
though at times with slight, although important, modifications and adjustments.
8
  
Still, bankruptcy should be different.  After all, in the world of Islam, there is in 
place a global practice of financing specifically branded as "Islamic finance" which 
                                                                                                                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This paper was first presented on 
September 16, 2011 at a symposium organized by the American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review and held 
at the St. John's University School of Law. 
1
 For simplicity's sake, I shall use this as my working definition of shari'a. Compare with Frank Vogel, An 
Introduction to the Law of the Islamic World, 31 INT'L. J. LEGAL INFO. 353, 356–357 (2003) (adopting a 
more conventional division between shari'a as divine, infallible and unchanging Divine Will and fiqh as 
human understanding of will, somewhat akin to my definition of shari'a). 
2
 See In the Arena: Gadhafi Reality Check; Middle East in the Balance; The Tea Party Effect; Rejecting 
the Muslim Brotherhood (CNN television broadcast Feb. 25, 2011), available at 
http://inthearena.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/25/former-member-rejects-muslim-brotherhood/ (interviewing A. 
Hirsi Ali, who contends Muslim Brotherhood desires society based on shari'a).  
3
 The reference, of course, is to the Islamic Revolution of Iran which took place in 1979. Abdullahi Ahmed 
An Na'im, Religion, the State, and Constitutionalism in Islamic and Comparative Perspectives, 57 DRAKE L. 
REV. 829, 829 (2009). 
4
 Sudan and Pakistan offer the most convenient examples of this phenomenon. See, e.g., id. (noting 1989 
Islamic military coup in Sudan).  
5
 Hamas is perhaps the clearest example of this, having won the Palestinian elections of 2006 and 
subsequently seized control of the Gaza strip in June 2007 after an outbreak of fighting between it and the 
other primary faction within the occupied territories, Fatah. See Nathan J. Brown, The Hamas Fatah 
Conflict: Shallow but Wide, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 42–43 (2010).  
6
 Shi'a Islamists played a central role in the drafting of Iraq's 2005 Constitution. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, 
Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the Iraqi Constitution, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 692, 698–701 
(2010) [hereinafter Ornamental Repugnancy]. 
7
 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 293, 323–27 (2010) 
[hereinafter The Death] (discussing the obsolesence of shari'a in all areas except personal status questions).  
8
 See id. (identifying instances where legal code has been adapted). 
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is expanding at dizzying rates of speed, from embryonic origins in the 1970's
9
 to a 
broad and varied global practice encompassing something on the order of $1 trillion 
worldwide.
10
 It clearly does not represent all of Muslim financial activity, it may not 
even represent a particularly large portion of the devout, but it is of a size and 
significance that is difficult to dismiss easily.  As such, the relative lack of concern 
with what Awad and Michael might describe as the "loss side" of the financing 
equation,
11
 what it is that these institutions are supposed to do when they are found 
to be insolvent, requires some consideration. 
The relationship between financing and insolvency is rather obvious as a 
general matter—clearly no creditor or debtor would enter into any sort of credit 
agreement, secured or otherwise, without some consideration of what might ensue 
should insolvency proceedings arise.  However, there is a particularly close 
connection in the Islamic context, for two reasons.  The first has to do with the 
genesis of Islamic finance and the source of its shari'a-derived prohibitions, at least 
as understood in modernity, which are supposed to render it distinct from what is 
generally regarded as the cruel rapaciousness of the West.
12
 This is the principle of 
profit sharing, endlessly touted as a core defining feature of the practice by its 
proponents.
13
 
Under the idealized understandings of Islamic finance, gains to a venture should 
be distributed among its partners in a manner agreed among them, and losses shared 
in precisely the same proportion.
14
 "With the gain comes the loss" is the oft quoted 
phrase of the Prophet Muhammad
15—a reason, proponents of Islamic finance argue, 
that interest on a money loan is prohibited.  Interest, after all, permits the creditor to 
receive its fixed gain irrespective of the debtor's gain or loss.
16
 The same might well 
be said of the Islamic objection to gharar, forms of speculation such as the sale of a 
                                                                                                                                                     
9
 IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 73 (1st ed. 2000) (Indicating Islamic 
finance started in the 1970s). 
10
 Respecting the current size of the industry, see Agence France-Presse, Islamic Finance Assets May Top 
One Trillion Dollars, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, June 14, 2010, available at 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=islamic-finance-assets-may-top-one-trillion-dollars-2010-06-14 
(predicting Islamic finance will top one trillion dollars in total assets this year.in 2010); see also Mushfique 
Shams Billah, Arab Money: Why Isn't the United States Getting Any?, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1055, 1075 n.109 
(2011) (suggesting GE Capital's sale of five-hundred million dollars Islamic bond shows strength of Islamic 
financial sector). It is difficult not to take such commonly cited figures with a grain of salt, however, given 
the lack of centrally, publicly available data respecting large numbers of Islamic finance transactions.  
11
 Abed Awad & Robert E. Michael, Iflas and Chapter 11: Classical Islamic Law and Modern 
Bankruptcy, 44 INT'L LAW. 975, 976 ( 2011). 
12
 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of Realism in 
the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 453–54 (2008) [hereinafter Muezzin's Call] (describing 
Islamic economics as maintaining that Western use of interest permits the rich to become richer).  
13
 See id. at 454 (describing underlying principles of Islamic economics as being "social justice, mutuality, 
and sharing").  
14
 See id. (indicating that leaders in Islamic economics movement called for financial institutions based on 
"social justice, mutuality and sharing"). 
15
 See Umar F. Moghul, No Pain, No Gain: The State of the Industry in Light of an American Islamic 
Private Equity Transaction, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 469, 470 n.5 (2007).  
16
 Hamoudi, Muezzin's Call, supra note 12, at 453 (describing Islamic economics objections to Western 
method of charging interest as involving no risk to lender).  
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runaway slave, to use a Prophetic example (anachronistic and of dubious 
provenance, but illustrative nonetheless).
17
 As the owner of the slave is bound to 
sell the runaway at a fraction of his cost, the purchaser will either profit at the 
owner's expense by finding the slave and returning him to bondage, or (more 
satisfactory under our modern sensibilities) the purchaser will never find the slave, 
thereby losing where the owner has gained.
18
 Islam will have none of this, replacing 
such competitive destructiveness with a more brotherly and generous form of 
capitalism wherein parties gain together and lose together, in equal proportion.
19
 
In keeping therewith, the original Islamic bank was envisaged as a sort of silent 
partnership (mudaraba to use the Islamic term), wherein one party (the bank) 
supplied the capital and the other (the borrower) supplied the labor and managed the 
venture.
20
 Profits were shared between them based on an agreed proportion, and 
losses divided also equally in the same proportion, except that the bank's liability 
ended with its capital investment.
21
 
To the extent that the principle of profit sharing is taken even the slightest bit 
seriously, the urgency of Islamic insolvency, or at least Islam-influenced 
insolvency, to accompany Islamic finance should be obvious.  Anything else would 
permit substantial violence to the principle of profit sharing at the crucial moment 
of insolvency, when it mattered most.  To see why this is so, let us assume a 
portfolio company A, which has entered into shari'a compliant financing 
arrangements (premised on profit sharing, we shall assume for now), receiving 
loans from three different Islamic banks to support its business activities under a 
single joint credit agreement.  All parties are thus part of the same venture, and 
should be sharing in the profits of Company A's activities in the same proportion 
that they suffer its losses.  Bank B, for example, might agree to receive 20% of the 
profits, Bank C 35% and Bank D 15%, leaving the Company itself with 30% of 
profit for its work.  Similarly, losses would be shared according to the same 
percentages.  Yet suppose Bank B were somehow permitted to declare a security 
                                                                                                                                                     
17
 FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND 
RETURN 88 (1998). 
18
 See id. at 89 (detailing Islamic objection to contracts with uncertain and potentially unrealizable 
outcomes). 
19
 See Hamoudi, Muezzin's Call, supra note 12, at 453–54 (illustrating that Islamic economics proponents 
prefer social justice achieved by balancing each party's risks by agreeing to distribute gains and losses 
proportionally). 
20
 In fact, and for purposes of completeness, the bank would be a two tiered mudaraba. The first tier would 
be the depositors acting as silent partners as against the bank, which undertook the operations. The second 
tier was then the bank itself as silent partner (using the capital supplied by the depositors), acting as silent 
partner vis-à-vis portfolio companies. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 17, at 130–31 (describing Islamic 
financial institution's earliest approach to capital depositing and investing through two-tier mudaraba model, 
as opposed to conventional Western bank model). 
21
 See id. (noting that bank's liability was limited to its capital investment). This limitation on the silent 
partner's loss is a limited derogation, admittedly, from the principle of loss sharing, though it is one that has 
been long established in the mudaraba. See id. at 109, 130–31 (indicating that partner's losses (and profits) 
were limited by predetermined proportions based on their share of capital investment). 
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interest, generally disallowed if non-possessory under the shari'a,
22
 in Company A's 
physical assets, perhaps in exchange for receiving a lower percentage of profits.  
Under such a scenario, if the arrangement is permitted to stand in insolvency 
proceedings, then the principle of proportional loss distribution would go unrealized 
precisely at the time when the losses were greatest, at insolvency.  B would be 
permitted a return on its capital through a sale of Company A's assets, and the other 
creditors would be left with comparatively little.  Needless to say, if this is the case 
for security, it is even more so as to liquidation preferences, which make a mockery 
of the principle of profit sharing in insolvency.   
The second reason that the relationship of finance to insolvency is particularly 
tight in the Islamic context is that Islam's central financing prohibition, respecting 
money interest on a loan, derives from a broadly prohibited practice known as riba, 
which is at its core a rule of insolvency.
23
 The reference to riba in the Qur'an 
addresses primarily the matter of debtors in financial distress.
24
 In that context, the 
prohibition relates to a creditor agreeing with a debtor on an extension for 
repayment of the latter's debt beyond the maturity date in exchange for more money 
to be paid at the later date.
25
 Instead of such practices, condemned in strident terms, 
the Qur'an requires either forgiveness of the debt, or a delay in the repayment until 
the debtor returns to solvency.
26
 The other forms of riba, including the prohibition 
on money interest more broadly, are not specifically referenced in the Qur'an.
27
 
Indeed, this was the basis upon which some Muslim reformers, including the most 
influential Arab legal scholar of the twentieth century, Abdul Razzaq al Sanhuri, 
were able to argue that interest on a loan may be permitted in times of need because 
it is not as central, but that interest on debt coming due could never be 
countenanced, a conclusion that has found its way into both the Egyptian and Iraqi 
Civil Codes.
28
 Whether or not Sanhuri's position can be sustained among a Muslim 
population suspicious of current modalities of economic and commercial order is 
hardly our subject, though there are reasons to be skeptical.
29
 Still, it would be 
                                                                                                                                                     
22
 See Michael J.T. McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Markets 
Development, 7 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 427, 455 (2007) (stating that security interests are generally required to be 
possessory). But see Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions, and the Promise of Islamic Law, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1301, 1315–23 (developing an ingenious argument based on Islam's sacred text for 
an alternative understanding). 
23
 See Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. 
INT'L L.J. 655, 655–56 (2008) (stating that original riba prohibition related to debtor in insolvency). 
24
 See id. at 658 (providing that riba is referenced in Qur'an in connection with debtor's failure to pay 
debts). 
25
 See id. at 658 (indicating that "the Qur'an categorically condemned" agreements to defer debtor's 
repayment past maturity date in exchange for increased debt liability). 
26
 See id. at 659. 
27
 See id. (observing that other forms of riba transactions are prohibited despite no explicit prohibition in 
the Qur'an). 
28
 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism and the 
Failure of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 89, 128–29 (2007) [hereinafter Muhammad's Social 
Justice] (describing Sanhuri's methodology in more detail). 
29
 Islamic finance advocates routinely denigrate approaches such as that adopted by Sanhuri as being an 
exercise in apologetics. See, e.g., Mohammad Uzair, Impact of Interest Free Banking, 1 J. ISLAMIC 
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passing strange if the obsessions respecting the prohibition of riba were taken so 
seriously as concerns ordinary finance to create an entire Islamic alternative, but 
ignored as concerns insolvency, where by all accounts it retains even more salience 
given its explicit mention in the Qur'an in that context alone.   
And yet, this is precisely what has occurred.  The interest in reforming 
bankruptcy laws is in fact astonishingly low, and bankruptcy is among the broad 
gamut of once Islamic legal regimes that have been, as a general matter, "totally 
replaced" by transplanted counterparts.
30
 To take one salient example, Qatar, which 
has begun a serious Islamization of its finance sector through issuing bank 
directives designed to expand Islamic banking within the country,
31
 initiated a 
bankruptcy regime in a 2006 law that bears all the hallmarks of a Western 
transplant.
32
 Indonesia and Malaysia have both recently reformed their bankruptcy 
laws as well, and despite ample growth in the practice of Islamic finance in both 
places, these laws are largely Western transplants as well.
33
 Even Iran, whose law 
should presumably be closely related to shari'a after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
                                                                                                                                                     
BANKING & FIN. 39, 40 (1984) ("By this time, there is a complete consensus of all . . . schools . . . and 
among Islamic economists that interest in all forms, of all kinds, and for all purposes is completely 
prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when people were apologetic about Islam, and contended that the 
interest for commercial and business purposes, as presently charged by the banks, was not prohibited by 
Islam."). 
30
 Wael B. Hallaq, Juristic Authority vs. State Power: The Legal Crisis of Modern Islam, 19 J. L. & 
RELIGION 243, 257 (2004) (acknowledging that many areas of law, including bankruptcy and commercial 
law, traditionally controlled by Islamic law have been "uprooted" and "replaced by their European 
counterparts"). This is not to say that all remnants respecting the shari'a rules concerning bankruptcy have 
been entirely removed from the globe. The main text discusses an Islamic remnant in Iran's bankruptcy code 
respecting the cause of insolvency. To take a related example, the notion of debtor's prison, quite common 
shari'a practice in the classical era as this article demonstrates, remains not only on the books in the United 
Arab Emirates, but very much the rule for personal bankruptcies, even as common law governs the higher 
end financial market in Dubai. See Simeon Kerr, Insolvency Laws Face Test, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d3f88f4-dce5-11dd-a2a9-000077b07658.html#axzz1WAQlnFY8 (comparing 
United Arab Emirates insolvency laws for financial institutions and business, which are based on UK 
common law, to UAE personal bankruptcy laws which are grounded in criminal law). Nevertheless, such 
remnants do not derogate from the generally accurate assertion that bankruptcy regimes throughout the 
Muslim world are not Islamic in origin but very much western transplants.  
31
 See Stable Outlook for Qatari Banks, says Fitch Ratings, CPI FINANCIAL, June 26, 2011, 
http://www.cpifinancial.net/v2/News.aspx?v=1&aid=8423&sec=Commercial%20Banking (highlighting 
directives to expand Islamic banking and financing in Qatar). 
32
 Qatar Law of Trade, No. 27 of 2006 arts. 606 et seq., available (in Arabic) at 
http://www.qcb.gov.qa/Arabic/Legislation/Documents/law-27-2006.pdf; Mahesh Uttamchandai, "No Way 
Out": The Lack of Efficient Insolvency Regimes in the MENA Region 4 (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 5609, 2011) [hereinafter World Bank Report], available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/03/24/000158349_20110324093837
/Rendered/INDEX/WPS5609.txt (stating that Qatar adopted Western influenced bankruptcy laws in 2006). 
33
 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Whole Business Securitizations in Emerging Markets, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT'L L. 521, 522 (2002) (describing Malaysian bankruptcy regime as having been inherited from the United 
Kingdom); Stacey Steele, The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia: Towards a Modern Corporate 
Bankruptcy Regime?, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 144, 144–49 (1999) (describing adoption of new bankruptcy 
laws in Indonesia as heavily influenced by Western laws). See generally Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2003 
(Malay.), available at http://www.chaps.com.my/Publication/Act.pdf (revealing modest amendments to 
bankruptcy regime and virtually nothing by way of Islamization). 
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has managed to keep the very same pastiche of bankruptcy laws that have been in 
place since the rule of the Shah's father, in 1932, despite their obvious and desperate 
need for improvement.
34
  
I submit that there are two primary bases for the discrepancy as between the 
increased interest as to Islamic finance and the near total lack of interest in Islamic 
insolvency, each of which demonstrates the rather marginal relevance of law in 
Islamic revivalism.  The first reason relates to the fact that the shari'a insolvency 
rules are not terribly useful or relevant to the ordering of modern commercial 
societies, and inevitably when this is the case, as it is with company laws and 
commercial codes, the tendency within the Islamic world is not to seek to reform 
these codes through new interpretive efforts, a reopening of the gates of ijtihad to 
use the colorful Islamic metaphor.
35
 Rather, the preference has been to enact the 
transplant, and more or less ignore the traditional Islamic rules.
36
 
The second reason is more specific to the nature of Islamic finance.  While at 
one time the practice may have been interested in the creation of entire state 
systems operating on its basis, at this point Islamic finance has transcended national 
boundaries to develop rules, standards and modalities of operation that conform 
remarkably well across national boundaries, beyond the scope of any single national 
jurisdiction.
37
 As a result, far from seeking to regularize the practice through law, 
Islamic finance specifically disclaims its legal nature through a variety of 
mechanisms, most prominently choice of law clauses that establish a law other than 
                                                                                                                                                     
34
 Ardeshir Atai, Investor Protection In Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT 
STRATEGIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON EXAMINING LOCAL BANKRUPTCY 
SYSTEMS, ANALYZING RECENT AND PROPOSED CHANGES TO LAWS, AND PREPARING SUCCESSFUL CLIENT 
STRATEGIES (2011) (stating that Iranian bankruptcy laws need reform since they "no longer meet present-
day business needs"). 
35
 Respecting the reopening of the gates of ijithad and the reinterpretation of sacred text, see Hamoudi, 
Muhammad's Social Justice, supra note 28 at 127, n.225 (detailing ongoing debates among Islamic scholars 
over applicability and acceptability of Islamic law reform to solve modern societal problems while "still 
remaining . . . faithful to the Qur'an . . . ."). 
36
 To be clear, this is not to say that the insolvency regimes throughout the Muslim world are particularly 
well run, transplanted or not. In fact, throughout the Middle East and North Africa, this hardly seems to be 
the case. There are places, among them Yemen, Iran and Jordan, where there is no single comprehensive 
bankruptcy code, as opposed to a pastiche of laws that deal with matters related to insolvency. World Bank 
Report, supra note 32, at 12 (stating that these countries are without comprehensive bankruptcy laws). There 
are other places where laws exist but are either poorly conceived, poorly implemented, or some combination 
of the two. World Bank Report, supra note, 32 at 1 (discussing the inefficient implementation of existing 
laws). The situation is better in other parts of the Muslim world beyond the Middle East and North Africa, 
such as Malaysia, which ranks slightly ahead of China respecting the effectiveness of its regime. World 
Bank Doing Business Report (Malaysia) 2011, p. 67, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/db11/mys.pdf. 
(noting that Malaysia is globally ranked at fifty-five, while China is ranked at sixty-eight). In any event, the 
point here is not to outline the relative success, or lack thereof, of the insolvency regimes in the Muslim 
world but only to point out the lack of interest in Islamizing them even in a context where all too many such 
regimes are in desperate need of reform.  
37
 Governance and Islamic Finance, HAWKAMAH NEWSLETTER (9th Newsletter) (Hawkama: The Institute 
for Corporate Governance), Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 7, available at 
http://www.hawkamah.org/news_and_publications/newsletter/index.html (noting the operation of Islamic 
banking institutions in over seventy-five countries). 
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the shari'a to govern the contract, vesting private shari'a review boards rather than 
independent regulatory agencies with the power of determining Islamicity and 
specifically disallowing reference to shari'a as a means to invalidate or indeed even 
interpret the agreement.
38
 The practice, that is, has developed into one based and 
policed (as to Islamicity) entirely on private and internal contractual 
arrangements.
39
 As such, being divorced as it is from any sort of Islamic legal 
practice, it is also necessarily uninterested in ensuring parallel rules of insolvency, 
which are necessarily made and administered by the separate national states.   
I will discuss each of these reasons for the comparative lack of interest in 
Islamic bankruptcy in turn, and conclude with considerations of broader 
implications as they concern the rise of Islamism and its effect on national law in 
Muslim states.   
 
II.  ISLAMIC INSOLVENCY AS NATIONAL LAW 
 
A. The Rules of Islamic Insolvency 
 
To be absolutely clear, my belief that Islamic insolvency is not well suited to be 
the national law of modern Muslim nation states is not meant as criticism of the 
system of administering bankruptcy proceedings as developed by the medieval 
jurists who established rules not entirely dissimilar to those of modernity in order to 
handle problems of insolvency.   
As described in an admirable and exhaustively researched piece by Jason 
Kilborn on the subject, under the Sunni classical rules, insolvency proceedings 
generally began with a creditor hauling a debtor before a judge in order to 
substantiate the debt.
40
 No distinction is made as between an individual debtor or 
that of a commercial enterprise, largely because no conception of corporate 
personality existed.
41
 Once convinced of the debt, the judge could confirm the debt, 
and quite likely, order the debtor imprisoned.
42
 While it is true that, as Awad and 
Michael point out, a debtor could escape prison by demonstrating an inability to pay 
debt,
43
 in fact jurists tended to read this requirement rather restrictively.
44
 If there 
was so much as a suspicion that the debtor had assets, he or she was imprisoned.
45
 
                                                                                                                                                     
38
 See discussion infra Part III. (discussing privatization of Islamic Finance). 
39
 See Umar F. Moghul & Arshad A. Ahmed, Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. 
Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: A First Impression Of Islamic Finance, 27 
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 150, 189–90 (2003) (describing the reliance on English and New York law to support 
the notion that contracts should be upheld as written). 
40
 Jason Kilborn, Foundations of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources, Methodology, 
Diversity 17, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1908896. 
41
 Awad & Michael, supra note 11, at 985 (stating that in classical Islamic bankruptcy no distinction is 
made between individuals and companies because companies did not have legal personality). 
42
 Kilborn, supra note 40, at 17–18. 
43
 Awad and Michael, supra note 11, at 997. 
44
 See Kilborn, supra note 40, at 19–20 (stating that imprisonment is only avoided when there is no 
suspicion of non-essential assets). 
45
 Id. at 19. 
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Witnesses that testify as to the existence of assets on the part of the debtor are given 
preference over the debtor's testimony denying it, at least in the Maliki school.
46
 
The result is effectively a reversal of the burden of proof, placing upon the debtor a 
rather onerous obligation to demonstrate insolvency until he may be released from 
prison.  Because of this and the general preference for corporal punishment for 
crimes under the shari'a, the predominant basis for imprisonment in the classical 
era was the alleged existence of unpaid debt on the part of an individual.
47
 
Thus, while the shari'a appears to mitigate the harsh effects of debtor's prison 
by adopting the Roman distinction as between bankruptcy that arises because of a 
party's negligence and that which arises through no fault of the debtor, a distinction 
that has managed to find its way into Iran's penal law as well
48
, in practice, at least 
in the classical era, the respite afforded debtors was not frequently ordered.   
Moreover, even when ordered, the result was not necessarily to the debtor's 
benefit.  Via a form of judicial order initiated by creditors,
49
 the debtor could be 
treated as incapacitated, equivalent to an insane person or a minor, while her assets 
and affairs were temporarily administered by a trustee of sorts to handle the 
liquidation.
50
 An orderly liquidation proceeds in which, for the reasons elaborated 
above, there are no liquidation preferences with certain specified and limited 
exceptions.
51
 While this practice was not universal, it was nearly so, with only a 
minority of scholars opposing it.
52
 Finally, there is simply no possibility of a court 
ordered discharge of debt after all of this.  The creditor retains the right to pursue 
the debtor for all debts owed for the balance of his life, even if the creditor is urged 
to forgive the debt out of charity.
53
 
The system is thus orderly and careful, and yet in some fundamental ways, 
medieval.  The notion of debtor's prison is particularly difficult.  While incapacity 
to pay does theoretically result in release, and while modern judges might well on 
this basis order release more liberally than their classical counterparts did, it seems 
difficult to discount the chilling effect that the mere possibility of prison would 
have upon potential entrepreneurs.   
Even more difficult is the lack of any sort of distinction as between personal 
and commercial bankruptcy.
54
 This problem has at its root the lack of the corporate 
form within classical Islam, a point upon which Kuran has placed a great deal of 
                                                                                                                                                     
46
 Id. at 22–23. 
47
 See Irene Schneider, Imprisonment in Pre-classical and Classical Islamic Law, 2 J. ISL. L. & SOC. 157, 
169 (1995) (explaining that imprisonment for debtors was common both before and after commencement of 
proceedings). 
48
 See Atai, supra note 34, at 36–37 (suggesting no criminal liability for no-fault bankruptcy and 
describing a penalty of six months to two years imprisonment for "negligent bankruptcy"). 
49
 Awad and Michael, supra note 11, at 988–89 (allowing for creditor to initiate judicial action). 
50
 Id. at 989. 
51
 Id. at 997.  
52
 Kilborn, supra note 40, at 23–24 (noting Abu Hanifa's opposition to debtor interdiction, but also noting 
the near universal support by other scholars, even some within his own school, of the practice).  
53
 See id. at 20 ("Discharge of a debt without payment or creditor consent is simply not an option . . . ."). 
54
 Awad & Michael, supra note 11, at 985 (noting no difference between personal and commercial 
bankruptcies in Islamic bankruptcy law).  
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emphasis.
55
 In a sense, therefore, the unwillingness to adopt Islamic bankruptcy law 
might well relate closely to the unwillingness of Islamic states to revert to 
partnership forms directly authorized by the shari'a.
56
 Yet given the close 
relationship as between credit on the one hand and bankruptcy on the other, one 
might imagine this is a difficulty that could have been bridged through adjusting the 
Islamic bankruptcy rules to accommodate the transplanted corporation, precisely as, 
say, Islamic finance embraces the corporate form without difficulty.  After all, it 
would be natural to expect that the rules of shari'a as they concern insolvent debtors 
are not incorporated wholesale—the classical era after all was very different from 
our times as an economic matter.  The more important question, the one that this 
paper seeks to address, is not so much the failure to adopt wholesale as why the 
shari'a seems to have no influence at all.   
Most difficult of all of the rules without doubt, however, are those concerning 
the permanency of debt and the lack of a court ordered discharge, anticipated by the 
Qur'anic prohibitions on riba described above and developed more fully in the 
shari'a.  As has been shown, the means by which debtor relief is achieved is 
through the strong ban on increase on the debt of an insolvent, along with a 
recommendation that the creditor forgive the debt owed to her out of charity.
57
 To 
ensure that debtors do not themselves exploit such rules, the Qur'an likewise also 
makes it something of a premier moral injunction for the believer to honor his 
contracts,
58
 which would necessarily include those resulting in the creation of debt.   
But therein lies the rub, for if the debtor is under a moral obligation to pay her 
debt, and it is the creditor who is urged to forgive it when the debtor is in hardship 
and unable to pay it back (or at the very least forbidden from charging interest for 
the delay in repayment), this could be understood to leave little by way of power to 
a third party, such as a judge, to offer the debtor any sort of discharge.
59
 Thus, much 
as under the Islamic rules of homicide and maiming it is the victim (or her family) 
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 TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE 97–116 (2011) (explaining absence of corporation in shari'a as 
understood by medieval jurists).  
56
 See Hamoudi, The Death, supra note 7, at 324 (describing general unwillingness of Muslim state to 
adopt traditional Islamic partnership forms).  
57
 See supra Part I.  
58
 See Qur'an 5:1 (Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall trans.) (stating importance of believers fulfilling their 
contracts).  
59
 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to understand the provisions otherwise, much 
less that forced discharges are necessary violations of Islam's sacred texts. Surely one could conclude that 
urging the creditor to forgive does not necessarily strip a third party of authority to reduce the debt 
unilaterally. Kilborn in fact offers a scintillating example from the Prophet that would seem to suggest 
precisely that forced discharge is possible. See Kilborn, supra note 40, at 10 (writing that Prophet told 
creditors they will have nothing beyond the debtor's assets, even if they are insufficient). My only point here 
is that if a debtor is obligated to repay, and a creditor is urged to forgive debt, as well as forbidden from 
collecting interest on outstanding debt, it seems natural to conclude, as medieval jurists generally seemed to 
notwithstanding the Prophetic example described by Kilborn, that a court could not unilaterally at the 
request of the debtor reduce the debt any more than it could at the request of the creditor permit an increase 
in the loan amount.  
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who may offer forgiveness but not the state,
60
 so the bankruptcy proceedings within 
Islam provide for orderly payment, but do not involve the forced discharge of 
excessive debt that is, in many ways, the very point of the bankruptcy proceeding in 
modernity.
61
 The debtor, rather, is obligated to pay for the balance of his life, 
though of course the creditor may not increase the debt due and remains under 
permanent advisement to forgive debt as moral good.
62
 It is hard to imagine that 
such a system would be one that would be of any interest to Muslim individuals, let 
alone large corporations (including Islamic financial institutions of one sort or 
another) which would prefer to take advantage of something more closely 
resembling a chapter 11 reorganization. 
 
B. The Mimicry Function of Islamic Finance 
 
Making it all the easier to dispense with the Islamic bankruptcy rules has been 
the fact that Islamic finance does not in reality take its own rhetoric respecting the 
purposes of its existence terribly seriously.  Rather than engage in anything 
resembling profit sharing, Islamic banks routinely offer vehicles to borrowers which 
are designed to mimic, both in legal consequence and economic effect, their 
conventional counterparts.
63
 Indeed, their success has been premised on the use of 
such vehicles rather than any sort of true "profit sharing" sort of structure, which, 
when used in the earliest days of Islamic finance, generally led to miserable 
failure.
64
 
Accordingly, given the mimicking function Islamic finance has adopted for 
itself, bankruptcy rules are important in Islamic finance, but not, importantly, so as 
to properly Islamize the system but so as to ensure that the Islamic finance 
mechanisms that are invented do, even in insolvency, end up fulfilling their 
mimicking function as closely as possible.  An excellent example of this arises in 
the case of the sukuk, which are often used as the equivalent of an asset 
securitization by means of a debt instrument.
65
 The principle of such a securitization 
is to isolate particular revenue generating assets of any given enterprise and give 
potential bondholders a secured interest in them, thereby reducing the risk of default 
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 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 39 (2006) ("[T]he plaintiff is the dominus 
litis . . . . [T]he prosecution, the continuation of the trial and the execution of the sentence are conditional 
upon his will. . . . The judge cannot interfere and acts merely as an arbiter who supervises the procedure, 
assesses the admissibility of evidence, and finally pronounces judgment on the basis of the plaintiff's claim 
and the evidence produced by him.").  
61
 Awad & Michael, supra note 11, at 997 (stating that there is no final discharge in Islamic bankruptcy).  
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 Id. at 999. 
63
 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Deviationist Doctrine and the Origins of 
Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L. L. 249, 292 (2008) [hereinafter Revolution] (describing the premier artifice, 
known as the murabaha).  
64
 VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 17, at 135 (explaining the extraordinary losses suffered by the earliest 
Islamic banks, which were based on profit-sharing arrangements).  
65
 See Michael J.T. McMillen, Asset Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital Markets: Structural Issues 
in These Formative Years, 25 WIS. INT'L. L.J. 703, 731–32 (2008) [hereinafter Asset Securitization] 
(describing sukuk). 
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and lowering the cost of borrowing.
66
 For example, if Company A as part of its 
operations owns Blackacre, on which it is receiving regular lease payments, it might 
seek to separate and segregate those lease payments into a special purpose vehicle, 
and then issue bonds relating to that segregated vehicle alone, with security interests 
running to the bondholders, because to do so would result in a lower coupon on the 
bond issued than would exist if Company A were to issue bonds on the whole of its 
operations.   
In order for this to work, however, it is of fundamental importance that the 
special purpose vehicle is "bankruptcy remote," meaning that it cannot be brought 
into bankruptcy by Company A or its creditors (excluding, of course, the 
bondholders in the asset backed securitization itself).
67
 In my experience, the 
structuring of such matters is complex and deeply jurisdiction dependent. 
In Islamic finance, such a debt instrument would not be permitted, and instead 
the bondholders would have to own the assets in question rather than merely hold 
security interests in them.
68
 Yet their rate of return would be manipulated to reflect 
the coupon rate of a conventional bond through a variety of gimmicks.  These 
equity holders, for example, would have to "return" equity proceeds received in 
excess of the coupon rate as a "reward" to the venture, paying them into a reserve 
fund, and the reserve fund could be used to raise equity proceeds in any subsequent 
year to the coupon rate to the extent that they were less than the coupon rate.
69
 
Manipulate the funds being paid to the equity holders to assure a sizable reserve 
fund in the early years, and a coupon rate is largely assured.   
Importantly, however, the bondholders are not, as a formal matter, secured 
creditors of the asset backed special purpose vehicle.  They are its owners.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, this formal recognition of ownership could raise tax 
concerns, but it could also raise bankruptcy concerns relating to remoteness.  It is 
therefore quite important to Islamic finance practitioners that the bankruptcy 
matters are addressed such that bankruptcy remoteness in the context of the Islamic 
vehicle is no different than it would be for a conventional vehicle.  Much 
consideration of bankruptcy law and its effects therefore arises in this context.   
The example is, admittedly, somewhat technical, as all examples of Islamic 
finance operating in insolvency tend to be.  The point, however, is not an 
insignificant one.  To describe it again and elaborate further, Islamic finance is not 
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 See id. at 732–33 (describing principle and purpose of asset securitization and defining securitization).  
67
 See id. at 734 (describing ways of creating "bankruptcy remote" special purpose vehicles).  
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 See id. at 739 (describing requirement of ownership of assets in Islamic bond structures).  
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 While taking exception to some forms of sukuk, the influential cleric Taqi Usmani did declare 
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designed to profit share but to mimic as closely as possible conventional finance 
vehicles in both legal and economic effect while at the same time retaining 
sufficiently distinctive Islamic veneer and vernacular as to be credibly referred to as 
"Islamic".
70
 Bankruptcy rules must be designed so as to permit that mimicking 
purpose, or the Islamic finance vehicle cannot survive.  As such, bankruptcy rules 
are important to Islamic financiers, and to the influential Islamic Finance Services 
Board, which has commenced an initiative in 2006 specifically relating to the 
creation of an effective legal infrastructure for Islamic finance, of which bankruptcy 
law is a key part.
71
 This is not, however, meant to ensure "Islamic" bankruptcies, 
but rather to ensure that Islamic finance transactions are treated appropriately in 
insolvency, as functional equivalents of conventional transactions.
72
 
 
C. The Resulting Problem of Islamic Bankruptcy 
 
Yet to all of this an objection can be made.  While upon cursory inspection (all 
I can claim to have done in these few pages), the rules of insolvency in the shari'a 
are ill suited to create a modern bankruptcy regime, certainly the same thing could 
have been said of Islamic finance in its infancy, with its dependence on the 
unsustainable mudaraba form.  Yet just as modern Muslims (and modern non-
Muslim practitioners of Islamic finance) have managed to create structures to meet 
Islamic finance objectives through manipulation of the medieval forms to achieve 
the mimicking function, the same could be possible as concerned Islamic 
bankruptcy.  Put differently, even if Islamic finance is more concerned with 
achieving mimicry than establishing genuine profit sharing, and even if Islamic 
insolvency rules on their face do not seem helpful, why not massage and manipulate 
Islamic bankruptcy rules as Islamic finance rules have been so as to achieve the 
same result, at least in Muslim majority societies?
73
 
A major problem, I suspect, would arise as to complexity that would be difficult 
to bridge.  That is to say, it is one thing to create and build upon a series of 
elaborate structures to mimic conventional finance, relying for all else upon 
conventional institutions whose functions are well established and whose operations 
are predictable (among them the corporation, the insolvency regime and the tax 
collection mechanisms).  It would be quite another to attempt to create alternative 
Islamic institutions for each of the above through similar attempts at mimicry.  At 
some level and at some point, the transaction costs, and the uncertainty and 
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 Ibrahim Warde, The Relevance of Contemporary Islamic Finance, 2 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 
159, 168 (2009) (acknowledging basic thrust of Islamic finance as mimicking conventional finance).  
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42 INT'L. LAW. 1017, 1024 (2008).  
72
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 Naturally, to the extent Islamic finance thrives in non-Muslim societies, it would have to rely on 
different bankruptcy structures than those envisioned by Islam.  
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unpredictability of some of the institutions in their early phases would be so 
daunting as to make the entire enterprise nearly commercially unsustainable.  It has 
proven far easier to limit the mimicry innovation infrastructure to finance than to 
attempt to expand it beyond that, an undertaking that could lead to potentially 
disastrous complicating effect. 
There is, however, an even more important reason that bankruptcy regimes 
remain transplanted and ignored by proponents of Islamic finance, and it is 
described below. 
 
III.  THE PRIVATIZATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
The credibility of Islamic finance goes down hard among those more committed 
to the rhetoric of an alternative system of financing that is supposed to be attuned to 
profit but also rooted more deeply in profit sharing, humanity, fairness and social 
justice.  The time honored means that Islamic finance uses to bridge this gap as 
between its rhetoric and reality are that it is but an infant in a gargantuan world of 
conventional finance vehicles and is therefore forced to compromise its idealistic 
visions, but only temporarily, until it grows sufficiently large as to make its own 
rules.
74
 Its compromises, to use Usmani's term as concerns the most popular artifice, 
the murabaha, are thus but a "transitory step" toward an "ideal Islamic mode of 
financing."
75
 Yet with nearly a half century having passed since its substantial rise, 
with $1 trillion in assets and with Islamic banking desks opening even at financial 
giants such as HSBC,
76
 profit sharing as replacement for debt financing seems as far 
away as ever, and the restlessness and discontent only grows. 
Given such discontent among the laity, which one can only assume affects the 
flesh and blood individuals who compose the judiciary and any potential arbitration 
panel, a problem arises.  To use the words of the eminent Kilian Bälz, who has put 
it best, Islamic law, to the Islamic financier, is less law than risk, something of an 
enforcement liability to the industry.
77
 It would be a disaster, after all, if judges or 
arbitrators could disallow particular, elaborate forms of artifice as violative of the 
shari'a because they are interest in disguise.
78
 Much of the industry is built on the 
manufacture of interest in disguise.  Some have argued, as a partial solution to this, 
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 Cf. Steven T. Taylor, Growth of Islamic Finance Activity Fuels Dynamic Legal Practice That Demands 
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Studies Program, Harvard Law School 9), Sept. 2008, at 8.  
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standardization within the industry so as to distinguish permissible transactions 
from impermissible ones more clearly,
79
 and indeed certain groups have issued 
standards, most prominent among them the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
of Islamic Financial Institutions ("AAOIFI").
80
 Nevertheless, the AAOIFI rules are 
without question nonbinding on decision makers and practitioners alike.
81
 As such, 
the threat that in enforcement proceedings, before court or arbitral panel, a shari'a 
violation might be found and might be rendered the basis for nonenforceability of 
the contract remains real. 
Islamic finance has adapted to minimize this threat that has arisen through 
broad discontent of its formalism largely through privatizing its practice.  A decade 
ago, the choice of law provisions of Islamic finance contracts might potentially go 
so far as to include reference to shari'a, perhaps along with English law, though in 
such a confounding manner that in at least one case an English court decided to 
ignore the shari'a reference as hopelessly vague and difficult to administer.
82
 Such 
references, however, have largely disappeared, with choice of law clauses clearly 
not making any reference to shari'a but rather to the state law of a jurisdiction, such 
as New York or England, where it can be reasonably assured that a contract will be 
interpreted according to its terms.
83
 Moreover, the recent trend has been to further 
marginalize any legal effect to shari'a by including a clause forbidding the parties 
to resort to it during enforcement proceedings as a basis for disallowing the 
contract.
84
 That is to say, not only may the court not consider shari'a, but nobody 
may raise its violation as a defense.  To do so would constitute a breach of contract. 
Therefore, rather than being achieved through mechanisms of law, Islamicity 
arises through the blessing of the transaction by a group of external figures paid by 
the parties to the transaction, known as the shari'a review board.
85
 Its determination 
respecting compliance with shari'a is therefore final and nonreviewable, or at least 
the contracts are drafted as to make the board's compliance determination as final 
and nonreviewable as possible.  While in theory this could mean that anything could 
be sanctioned as "Islamic" without legal consequence so long as one could get three 
people together to call themselves a board and declare it so, in fact it is rather silly 
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 See Pierre M. Gaunard, Hdeel Abdelhady & Nabeel A. Issa, Islamic Finance, 45 INT'L. LAW. 271, 279 
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predictability and transparency in Islamic Finance.").  
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 See Bälz, supra note 77, at 23–24 (explaining use of waiver of shari'a defense clauses).  
85
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to imagine such inanity.  As with religious practice more generally, adhered to as it 
is by a community of committed believers and enforced as it is through shaming, 
and through references to divine reward and punishment, modalities of practice in 
finance have achieved remarkable convergence (at least among those not 
disillusioned with the industry entirely).  There is no realistic access to the 
substantial capital committed to Islamic finance by inventing unrecognized artifices 
and gaining their acceptance by an unknown and therefore insufficiently respected 
shari'a review board.  Some adherence to prevailing practice is necessary, even if 
made considerably more flexible (some might say inappropriately so) than it would 
be if the industry were standardized. 
Needless to say, this evolution does not lend itself well to the creation of an 
Islamic bankruptcy regime to complement it.  Bankruptcy is anything but a private 
contractual matter, it is intimately connected to the judiciary of one or more states, 
and involves state regulation and oversight of the highest order, whose very purpose 
is to modify and ameliorate contract provisions respecting repayment that the debtor 
is unable to meet.
86
 Indeed, bankruptcy rules are often mandatory and not generally 
subject to variation by contract.
87
 Thus, as Islamic finance drifts on its continued, 
determined path away from state recognition and enforcement of its arrangements 
on the basis of their Islamicity, its dependence on other parts of Islamic law—
whether they be Islamic rules of bankruptcy, Islamic partnership forms or Islamic 
rules respecting compensation for private wrongs—largely dissipates.  Rather than 
being the object of clerical revival, everything is instead designed to be handled 
adequately by, among other possibilities, the selection of New York law,
88
 per an 
agreement drafted by lawyers in top New York law firms which would be 
adjudicated by a judge in Manhattan with no experience in or background 
respecting Islamic law.   
 
IV.  REFLECTIONS ON IMPLICATIONS FOR SHARI'A AND LAW 
 
While Islamic finance may have had its own material reasons to avoid 
excessive entanglement with Islam as a form of legal regulation, in fact the 
privatization of shari'a appears to be broader than merely the privatization of 
Islamic finance.  If the searing image of Islamism has been roving morals police 
ensuring proper Islamic behavior (still a regular feature of the landscape of both 
Iran
89
 and Saudi Arabia
90
) it is notable that Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of by far the 
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most Islamist of Iraq's current Islamist movements, denounced any legal ban on the 
niqab, or face veil, such as that adopted in France, as being an unacceptable 
repression of freedom, and suggested the same would be the case if the face veil 
were required.
91
 To be sure, Sadr's comments referred to a veil over the face,
 92
 
which as he himself indicated is not an Islamic requirement according to the rules of 
the Shi'i sect to which he belongs, and not a headscarf, which is.
93
 It is hard to 
imagine that Sadr would explicitly describe the right of a woman to walk the streets 
with her hair entirely uncovered as an "expression of freedom." 
Yet as one who has spent years in post Saddam Iraq, it is a fact that women do 
so walk the streets in Baghdad, and it is notable that in this environment, Sadr has 
fallen silent on legal enforcement of women's dress entirely except to describe 
particular, potential legal prohibitions as repression of freedom.  At the very least, 
using the law to enforce even core aspects of shari'a seems to have fallen from his 
list of priorities.  This was not the case years earlier when his Mahdi army 
functioned in Basra largely as a morals police.
94
 The dramatic unpopularity of the 
Mahdi army at the time, and the concomitant lack of interest among Iraqis of all 
sorts for morals policing, no doubt had something to do with his recalibration.
95
 
In so seeking to distance himself from the overt use of legal or quasi-legal 
mechanisms to give force to the shari'a, Sadr seems (belatedly) to have adopted the 
position of the Najaf clerics who are the final authority on matters of Islamicity 
within Iraq's Shi'i community.
96
 They rarely involve themselves in political matters 
except as to issues of broad popularity whose relationship to shari'a is indirect.
97
 
They may well have something to say about the consumption of alcohol, or the 
taking of money interest, but tend to direct such matters internally, and not with 
expectation of legal state enforcement thereof.
98
 Certainly if the shariafication of 
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Iraq's largely secularized legal system were a priority for the clerics, one would 
have expected more by way of activity by now.   
The same might well be said of more lay Islamic movements in the Sunni 
world.  It is looking increasingly ridiculous to portray Turkey's AK party as 
dissembling in its commitment to secularism, conspiratorially ready despite its 
vociferous denials to the contrary to unveil its shari'a program as soon as it is given 
the opportunity.  AK has been winning elections for nearly a decade, after all, and 
no such program has arisen.
99
 Its recent efforts are designed to expand 
democratization, not implement shari'a, hardly a surprise given its popularity 
relative to other spheres of influence in Turkey, among them the judiciary and the 
military.
100
  
Moreover, AK has repeatedly sought to reverse a ban on headscarves in public 
universities, yet it has attempted this using language concerning religious freedom 
that sounds positively liberal.
101
 In other words, it seeks greater space for Islam to 
develop beyond the law, precisely what Sadr was attempting to articulate in his own 
remarks concerning the niqab.  The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (along with not a 
few clerics and veiled women) likewise is easily exercised by dismissals of the 
headscarf as regressive and primitive.
102
 However, it overtly and strongly indicates, 
in contradistinction to its position more than a decade ago, that the headscarf is 
from a legal perspective a personal choice, albeit a religiously mandated one.
103
 The 
law, under these formulations, should be designed so as to permit, perhaps even 
support, the prominent and public strengthening of shari'a, but not to enforce or 
require it.   
Even more conservative communities follow the same pattern.  The jurist to 
whom members of Hezbollah turned for spiritual guidance until his death, 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlullah, spoke positively of a religiously neutral state law to 
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which all religious communities could be bound within a framework within which 
personal adherence to religion dictate could be realized.
104
 One major effort of the 
hard-line Salafi movement, or at least elements of it, in the post Mubarak upheaval 
in Egypt has been the creation of a "one-million-beard campaign," an effort to urge 
Egyptians to grow their beards as mandated by (the Salafi understandings 
respecting) shari'a, specifically on the grounds that "[n]o one should stand in the 
way of (religious) commitment."
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To be clear, I do not intend to suggest that these figures, any one of them in 
fact, is a liberal.  Many would almost certainly endorse the illiberal idea that a 
father could compel (at least through nonviolent means) his nineteen-year-old 
daughter to wear a veil.  Many live in societies in which religious instruction is a 
required school subject and would seek to keep it that way.  Certainly attempts to 
secularize family law are regularly denounced by Islamist groups, and indeed they 
often wage campaigns to Islamize such rules more thoroughly.
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What I do mean to suggest is that to some extent the rise in interest in Islamism 
has been privatized, such that priorities are less to reform the legal sector and more 
to increase the personal and communal piety of the believers.  For a variety of 
material reasons, this may have taken a more extreme form in Islamic finance, 
through its specific disclaiming of the use of Islam as law, but it is on the rise well 
beyond it.  Islamists are no less committed to the shari'a than they have been, but 
they are considerably less committed to its realization through the mechanism of 
state law. 
Seen through this lens, there is nothing at all surprising about the lack of 
interest in Islamic bankruptcy.  The institutions of bankruptcy are after all so closely 
tied to the state and its institutions that to Islamize it would involve a detailed 
legislative enactment and the creation of appropriate Islamic regulatory 
mechanisms.  If Islamists are reluctant to engage in matters as varied as dress codes 
and banking, they certainly are not interested in dealing with it as concerns 
insolvency.  Such matters, in the end, to a growing number of the world's Islamists, 
are best left to Caesar. 
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